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LAWS OF NEGLIGENCE
ARTHUR W. STOKES*

THE

of negligence, which is no doubt as old as the
history of man, in today's complex society is perhaps' the
one phase of law on which more legalithought is expended than
any other single branch of legal jurisprudence. The rules are
constantly expanded, both by legislative enactments and judicial interpretations, becoming increasingly more complex.
However, certain fundamentals hereafter considered are basic.
Negligence is generally considered as any contact invading
another's protected interest, where the conduct falls below
the standard established either by legislative enactments or
judicial opinion for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. Judicial decision or jury pronouncement using as a standard the conduct of a reasonable man
under like circumstances fixes standards for the protection
of others against unreasonable risk of harm. In order that
negligent conduct may be actionable such conduct must be
the legal or proximate cause of the invasion or injury,
and the person injured must not have so acted either prior
thereto or subsequently in such a manner as to have disabled
himself from bringing the action. The act may be either one
of omission or commission with like consequences.
The legislative enactment, whether it be by the legislature
of the nation, state, municipality, or a commission in its respective sphere, within its particular power, may establish a
standard which is final and conclusive, unlesi it is so vague
as to require definition by a court or jury, or application to
the facts of a particular situation by the jury. On the other
hand, it may also be fixed by judicial decision because of its
frequent recurrence under the same or similar circumstances,
and thus become a fixed standard which governs the conduct
of persons in particular circumstances. Failing this, it becomes the duty of the jury to determine whether or not the
particular act at the time and place was below the standard
of a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances.
Furthermore, as a qualification, it must be understood that
the violation of a legislative enactment does not under all
LAW

* Lecturer at the University of North Dakota School of Law; member of the
North Dakota Bar; member of Day, Lundberg, Stokes, Vaaler & Gillig, Grand
Forks, North Dakota.

NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS

circumstances create liability. This is for the reason that as a
condition to its creating a legal liability, violation of a law,
ordinance, or rule by an act of omission or commission, it
must first be established that the enactment violated was intended exclusively or in part for the benefit of the injured person as an individual, and that the harm done was one the legislative enactment was intended to protect him from, and the
harm resulted from the particular hazards which the enactment was designed to protect, and, of course, that the violation
was the proximate cause of the injury.,
That all violations of legislative enactments of whatever
kind or nature do not create civil liability unless they come
within the foregoing definition is quite clear. Numerous laws
are enacted solely for the purpose of protecting the interests
of the state or municipality, or to secure to the individuals
as members of the public only, certain rights and privileges,
or impose upon persons the duty of performing some service
on behalf of the state or municipality for the benefit of the
public, and not for the benefit of the individual as a class.
The standard by which the negligence of an act is measured
is determined by the acts of a reasonable man under the same
or similar circumstances, and applies in all instances except
as tor children and incompetents. Nevertheless, it is recognized
that in the application thereof by the court and jury there are
different degrees of care which will be applied by consideration of the qualities of attention, knowledge, experience, intelligence and judgment of the individual. Further, it must be
pointed out that the standard of care by which a person's act
is measured where it affects others, is the standard of a reasonable man, and where it becomes important on the question
of contributory negligence his act is measured as the act of a
man of reasonable or ordinary prudence for his own protection. This distinction becomes important, and will be more
fully discussed hereafter in connection with contributory
negligence.
The fact that there has been an act of negligence and an
injury does not of itself indicate legal liability on the part of
the negligent individual. Before ther6 is legal liability two
things must exist: (1) Negligence, and (2) proximate cause
1 Axelson v. Jardine, 57 N.D. 524, 223 N.W. 32 (1928).
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as hereinafter defined, disregarding for the moment matters
2
of defense which will nevertheless avoid legal liability.
Negligence, in order to create legal liability, must be the
proximate cause of an injury. To be the proximate cause it
must involve conduct creating an unreasonable risk of harm
to the injured person as a member of a class of persons, who
is protected from such act, and the harm must result from the
hazard from which he is protected, which hazard is created
by the defendant's negligent or wrongful act. Proximate cause
is the real cause, probable cause, nearest cause,, or the cause
without which there is no accident or resulting harm, or as
frequently stated, that cause which in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces injury. To arrive at a conclusion as to whether or
not an alleged negligent act is a proximate cause of injury the
factors which contribute in producing the harm, and the extent to which they contribute in producing it, are considered;
whether the negligent conduct has started a force, or series of
forces which are in continuous and active operation up to the
time of harm, or has created a situation harmless unless acted
upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsible,
and lastly, the element of time which has elapsed since the
3
original negligent act.
To constitute the negligent act a proximate cause of resulting injury it is important that the negligent act be more
than an incidental factor. It must be a real cause or a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. It is not a substantial factor or real cause in producing an injury if the
harm would have resulted even though the defendant had not
been negligent,' unless it is aconcurring act of negligence as
one of a number, each acting independently, and each sufficient by itself to bring about the harm.5 Generally, in order
to determine whether ,ornot the negligent act under investigation in a particular set of circumstances is the real or probable
cause it is necessary to determine whether there is an unbroken chain of causes and effects leading from the negligent
act and resulting in the injury, and further whether the negligent act was of itself a substantial factor in causing the injury.
2 Bowers v. Great Northern Ry., 65 N.D. 384, 259 N.W. 99 (1935);
Payne, 48 N.D. 911, 187 N.W. 817 (1922).
3 Restatement, Torts §433 (1934).
4 Wilmes v. Mihelich, 223 Minn. 139, 25 N.W. 2d 837 (1947).
5 Stockfeld v. Sayre, 69 N.D. 42, 283 N.W. 788 (1939).

Clark v.

NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS

The fact that the negligent person could not foresee in advance
the result of his negligent act is not of consequence, if harm
resulted to a person protected from an act of such nature."
Further, the negligent act is not the proximate cause, if
between the original act of negligence and the resulting injury
an intervening force brings about the harm as a superseding
cause. If the intervening cause is merely an additional cause,
or one of concurring negligence, it does not relieve the originally negligent person. On the other hand, where the intervening cause brings about a harm different than would ordinarily have been expected to happen, was acting independently
at the time, and was not a result of the original negligence,
but usually the result of some wrongful act of a disconnected
7
third person the original wrongdoer is relieved from liability.
If in a factual situation there exists negligence, proximate
cause, and resulting injury there still may not be liability because of the existence of some bar which relieves A negligent
party from liability, the most important of which is contributory negligence. Numerous other defenses exist which will
not be discussed.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured person which falls below the standard to which he
should conform for his own protection at the time and place,
and which is a legally contributing cause, cooperating with
the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the harm.'
Where negligence is any conduct which creates circumstances
causing undue risk to others, contributory negligence is conduct which involves an undue risk of harm to the person who
sustains the injury. The standard of care is different, in that
in negligence the standard is that care which the normal person exercises for the safety of others, while in contributory
negligence it is not the standard of the normal man, but of a
reasonable prudent normal man exercising care for his own
safety. As in negligence, so also in contributory negligence a
necessary ingredient is proximate cause or causal relationship
between it and the resulting harm-otherwise it is no bar, no
matter how negligent the injured party is at the time and place
of the accident or injury,9 and unless the legislature has enactCrowe v. McBride, 25 Cal. 2d 318, 153 P.2d 727 (1944).
State v. Columbus Hall Ass'n, 75 N.D. 275, 27 N.W. 2d 664 (1947).
s Restatement, Torts §463 (1934).
9 Garland v. Nelson, 219.Minn. 1, 17 N.W. 2d 28 (1944).
6
7
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ed a different rule, usually known as a comparative negligence
statute, the common law rule is that an injured person guilty
of negligence which contributes to the accident or injury as a
proximate cause even in the slightest degree is not entitled to
recover.
Nevertheless, a negligent plaintiff may recover if he invokes in his own behalf and brings himself within the doctrine
known as Last Clear Chance, the conditions of which are set
forth in Section 479, Restatement of the Law of Torts, as
follows:
"A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to a risk
of harm from the defendant's subsequent negligence may recover for harm caused thereby if, immediately preceding the
harm,
(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of
reasonable vigilance and care, and
(b) the defendant
(i) knows of the plaintiff's situation and realizes
the helpless peril involved therein; or
(ii) knows of the plaintiff's situation and has reason
to realize the peril involved therein; or
(iii) would have discovered the plaintiff's situation
and thus had reason to realize the plaintiff's
helpless peril had he exercised the vigilance
which it was his duty to the plaintiff to exercise,
and
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing ability to
avoid harming the plaintiff."
On point (b) - (iii) of the foregoing there is considerable
disagreement among the courts with respect to the duty to
discover as is shown in a comprehensive annotation contained
in 92 A. L.R. 47. To date, it does not appear that North Dakota
has adopted the rule that a defendant who should have discovered plaintiff's situation is nevertheless negligent. In numerous cases where railroad companies have been involved
the rule perhaps is based on the fact there is no duty on the
part of the railroad to discover trespassers upon its property.
However, in the case of Acton v. Fargo& Moorhead St. Ry., 10
and in the later case of Ramage v. Trepanier,11 it would appear
that the rule is applicable also in non-railroad cases, and the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for this district in the
1o 20

N.D. 434, 129 N. W. 225 (1910).
11 69 N.D. 19, 283 N.W. 471 (1938), noted, 16 N.D. Bar Briefs 163 (1939).
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case of State. of North Dakota v. N. P. Ry., 1- indicates that
the rule is definitely established in this state that there is no
duty to discover.
Another phase of the law of negligence which deserves consideration because of its frequent appearance, possibly due
to the guest law in the state of North Dakota, is the matter of
imputed negligence. It is well established that the negligence
of the driver is not imputed to the passenger, be he invitee or
guest of the driver, unless their relationship is such as to give
to the passenger some element of control. 13 Furthermore, imputed negligence is separate and distinct from the doctrine of
contributory negligence as a non-negligent passenger may be
barred from recovery if under the circumstances the negligence of his host driver may be imputed to him whereas even
though contributory negligence of the host driver may not be
imputed to the passenger the passenger may be guilty of independent contributory negligence which will bar recovery. 1
Worthy of note is an interesting phase of the doctrine of
imputed negligence in connection with property damage. Not
established in this state but fairly well settled in other states
is the rule that an owner of a vehicle in the possession of a
bailee may recover from a negligent third person even though
the bailee at the time and place of the accident was guilty of
contributory negligence, which would bar recovery by the
bailee.15 That this might also be the result in North Dakota is
suggested in the case of Zettle v. Lutovsky,s where the court
says:
"In our consideration of this case we have adopted the
theory upon which the case was tried in the district court and
upon which it was submitted to this court on appeal. At no
time during the course of the proceedings did the plaintiffs
contend that contributory negligence of plaintiffs' bailee was
not a defense to the action. In fact it appears that plaintiffs
conceded it was a proper defense if it could be established.
The fact that we have considered the questions as presented
is not to be construed as a holding on our part that the negligence of a bailee will preclude recovery by a bailor for injury
to his automobile."
12 171 F. 2d 506 (8th Cir. 1948).
is Christopherson v. Minneapolis-St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., 28 N.D. 128, 147 N.W.
791 (1914).
14 Wilson v. Oscar Kjorlie Co., 73 N.D. 134, 12 N.W. 2d 526 (1944).
15 Christensen v. Hennepin Transportation Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W. 2d
406 (1943). See Note, 147 A.L.R. 945 (1943).
16 72 N.D. 331, 7 N.W. 2d 180 (1942).
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That law is not an exact science is never more clearly evidenced than by an examination of the reported cases involving
the law of negligence. As no two snowflakes are exactly alike,
so are no two cases exactly alike. However, to the factual
situations must be added as ingredients witnesses, counsel,
court and jury, resulting in decisions apparently conflicting
and involving situations seemingly similar.
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